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Abstract:  
We analyze the efficiency properties of the negligence rule with liability insurance, 
when the tort-feasor’s behavior is imperfectly observable both by the insurer and the 
court. Efficiency is shown to depend on the extent to which the evidence is 
informative, on the evidentiary standard for finding negligence, and on whether 
insurance contracts can condition directly on the same evidence as used by courts to 
assess behavior. When evidence is not directly contractible, the negligence rule with 
compensatory damages is generally inefficient and can be improved by decoupling 
liability from the harm suffered by the victim. 
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1 Introduction
We consider the negligence rule combined with liability insurance when courts,
as well as insurers, have imperfect information about injurersbehavior. As-
sessing precautionary behavior is often di¢ cult, for instance when profes-
sional liability is involved. In the much discussed case of medical malprac-
tice, it has been suggested that court error induces defensive medicine(e.g.,
Kessler and McClellan, 1995), conversely that the combination of court er-
ror and liability insurance leads to underprecaution (e.g., Danzon, 1985, and
Harrington and Danzon, 2000). We analyze the conditions under which the
negligence rule together with liability insurance is consistent with e¢ cient
risk sharing and precaution levels.
Shavell (1982) showed that liability insurance is socially benecial under
the strict liability rule even with moral hazard. Victims are then fully com-
pensated and are therefore indi¤erent to the probability of accident. Since
it increases the utility of the insured, liability insurance is socially desirable
whether or not precautionary behavior is observable. There are no compara-
ble results regarding the e¤ect of liability insurance under the negligence rule.
Indeed, the usual assumption has been that courts could ex post perfectly
ascertain the injurers precautions. If the injurer is found to have exerted
less than due care, he is held liable for full compensatory damages, otherwise
he escapes liability. With due care set at the socially e¢ cient level, potential
injurers will undertake the appropriate precautions and be sure of avoiding
liability. Accordingly, there is no demand for liability insurance.
We extend the analysis of the negligence rule to situations where the in-
jurers level of care is imperfectly observable. Court error has been discussed
in this context but only for the case of risk neutral injurers, thereby preclud-
ing a demand for liability insurance (Diamond, 1974; Calfee and Craswell,
1986; Shavell, 1987; Kolstad, Ulen and Johnson, 1990; Edlin, 1994). Even in
this simple set-up, however, no simple conclusion seems to emerge from the
literature. One reason is the failure to introduce explicitly the legal concept
of evidentiary standard, which refers to the weight of evidencefor estab-
lishing negligence and di¤ers from the notion of due care. An exception is
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Fluet (2006) who characterizes the e¢ cient evidentiary standard for inducing
due care.
In the present paper, we also discuss evidentiary standards. Our setting,
however, is di¤erent. As courts may err, risk averse injurers will purchase lia-
bility insurance. The consequence is a two-level incentive problem: tort rules
impose liability risks on the injurer-insurer pair, resulting in a liability insur-
ance contract; the contract itself imposes penaltieson the injurer (through
deductibles and the like), which induces precautionary behavior. The issue
is whether the arrangement is socially e¢ cient in terms of risk sharing and
of precautions to prevent harm. Since under the negligence rule third parties
are not always compensated, Shavells argument on the e¢ ciency of liability
insurance does not apply. We show that e¢ ciency depends on the extent to
which the evidence is informative, on the evidentiary standard for establish-
ing negligence, and on whether insurance contracts can condition directly on
the same information as used by courts to assess behavior.
We rst consider the case of contractible evidence. The ex post evidence
about care, on which court decisions are based, is then assumed to be directly
contractible under the liability insurance policy, irrespective of the form of
the liability rule. A separation result then obtains between the role of legal
liability and that of insurers. Given the liability risk, the insurance contract
provides the optimal trade-o¤, under moral hazard, between risk-bearing and
incentives to take precautions. Legal liability, by contrast, serves to provide
the injurer-insurer pair with the incentives to design a contract inducing
an appropriate level of care. We characterize the set of e¢ cient liability
rules and show that the negligence rule with the appropriate evidentiary
standard belongs to this set, thereby extending Fluet (2006) to risk aversion.
Moreover, the characterization of the e¢ cient evidentiary standard, in terms
of the relation between due care and evidence about care, is the same as in
the risk-neutral case.
Next we consider the more realistic situation where the detailed evidence
used by courts to reach a decision is not fully contractible. For instance,
courts typically weigh many di¤erent testimonies to assess whether the in-
jurer exerted due care. In practice, it is not feasible to write down ex ante
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into the insurance contract all possible evidentiary outcomes. For simplicity,
we assume that the liability insurance policy can condition only on court
decisions. We show that, generally speaking, the negligence rule then yields
an ine¢ cient allocation. However, e¢ ciency can be restored through a mod-
ied negligence rule whereby court imposed damages di¤er from the victims
loss, i.e., if decoupling is allowed. In an e¢ cient rule, punitive damages
are then associated with a relatively demanding evidentiary standard, un-
dercompensatory damages with a relatively weak one. We provide a partial
characterization of when punitive rather than undercompensatory damages
are best. This depends on the nature of the likely evidence and on the injur-
ersattitude with respect to risk, e.g., their risk aversion and prudence.
In the literature, decoupledliability has been justied on many grounds,
usually in the context of the strict liability rule. A well known result is the
need for punitive damages when injurers are not always identied or when
victims do not always sue (Polinsky and Shavell, 1998, inter alia). Other
reasons include limited liability problems (Lewis and Sappington, 1999) or
the trade-o¤ between incentives to sue, with the resulting litigation costs,
and the injurers incentives to exert care (Polinsky and Che, 1991). In our
analysis, the benets from decoupling stem from the interaction between
the provision of appropriate incentives to the injurer-insurer pair and the
provision of a usefulsignal for designing the liability insurance contract.
We stress that court error in our model is due solely to imperfect infor-
mation about the injurers behavior. In the risk-neutral literature referred to
above, court error under the negligence rule is also often ascribed to mistakes
about the due care level, the injurers action being itself observable without
error. This is the approach followed by Sarath (1991) in her analysis of
liability insurance under the negligence rule. In that paper, the injurers pre-
cautions are revealed ex post during litigation, hence moral hazard is not an
issue in designing the liability insurance contract. It may be added that the
emphasis in Saraths paper is the trade-o¤ between litigation costs (through
incentives to sue) and incentives to exert care, given some liability rule. By
contrast, our focus is the characterization of e¢ cient rules in a context where
litigation costs are negligible.
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The paper develops as follows. Section 2 presents the basic set-up. Section
3 describes the equilibrium under arbitrary damage rules. In section 4, we
assume the evidence is contractible, provide a characterization of e¢ cient
damage rules, and discuss the negligence rule. Section 5 considers the case
where the liability insurance contract can condition only on court decisions.
Section 6 concludes. The proofs of propositions are in the appendix unless
the argument is obvious from the text.
2 The model
The basic framework is borrowed from Shavell (1982). There is a large pop-
ulation of identical potential injurers and an equal population of identical
potential victims. An injurer can accidentally harm at most one victim.
The following notation is used (subscripts denote partial derivatives, e.g.,
Uw = @U=@w):
l = victimsmonetary loss if there is an accident;
p = probability of accident;
e(p) = injurerse¤ort on accident prevention, e0 < 0, e00 > 0;
v = wealth of victims;
w = wealth of injurers;
U(w; e) = utility of injurers, Uw > 0, Uww < 0, Ue < 0, Uee  0;
t = unconditional transfer from injurers to victims.
Both injurers and victims are risk averse. The precautions taken by a
potential injurer  his level of care  are reected in p or equivalently e(p)
and are private information. We assume e0(1) = 0, e0(0) =  1 to ensure
interior solutions with 0 < p < 1. Our formulation for the injurers utility
function encompasses both the separable and non-separable forms with either
U(w; e) = u(w)   e or U(w; e) = u(w   e). We assume the validity of the
rst-order approach in deriving the optimal insurance contracts.
Injurers have su¢ cient wealth to pay for a victims loss, that is, there is
no limited liability problem. While an injurers care is not directly veriable,
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some information about his behavior becomes available ex post following the
occurrence of an accident. This is represented by a signal x with density
function f(x; p) on the support [0; 1] and corresponding cumulative F (x; p),
i.e., precautions determine the distribution of the signal. The random vari-
able x should be interpreted as a summary of all the detailed evidence
available ex post.1
Assumption 1: fp(x; p)=f(x; p) is strictly decreasing in x.
The assumption is the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) with
the convention that large values of x constitute favorableevidence in the
sense of suggesting high care. The condition implies Fp(x; p) > 0 except
at the boundaries of the support where the derivative is nil. In words, the
probability of unfavorable evidence (realizations below any given threshold
x) increases as precautions decrease. Restricting the support of f to the unit
interval simplies notation and is without loss of generality.
Assumption 2: pF (x; p) is convex in p.
Assumption 1 implies that the probability pF (x; p) of accident and
unfavorable evidence increases in p, i.e., with lower levels of precautions.
Assumption 2 means that this is so at an non decreasing rate.2
Injurers may be held liable for the harm imposed on third-parties. A
liability regime can in all generality be represented by a damage rule D(x).
This species the amount of damages paid to the victim by the injurer  or
his liability insurer  when an accident occurs and the ex post evidence is
x. Strict liability and negligence are specic forms of damage rules.
Under strict liability, the injurer is always held liable for full compen-
satory damages upon the occurrence of harm, which amounts to D(x) = l
for all x. Under the negligence rule, the injurer is liable for full compensatory
1If multidimensional evidence about the injurers precautions can be ranked in terms
of more favorable than, there exists an exhaustive scalar statistic x satisfying MLRP
(Milgrom 1981).
2The assumption amounts to the Convexity of the Distribution Function Condition (or
CDFC, see Rogerson, 1985) with respect to the event accident and unfavorable evidence.
A su¢ cient condition is Fpp  0.
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damages only if he is found to have exerted less than due care. We assume
that, in applying this rule, the court is provided with some bp as due-care
standard. One interpretation is that bp reects a social norm regarding con-
duct and corresponds to what would normally be expected from potential
injurers. Care being unobservable, the court must decide whether su¢ cient
care was exerted on the basis of imperfectly informative evidence. It will
nd negligence  that is, will rule that the defendants behavior led to p > bp
 if the evidence is su¢ ciently unfavorable. Denoting by bx the courts evi-
dentiary standard for nding negligence, the damage function is then of the
form
D(x) =
(
l if x < bx,
0 if x  bx, where bx 2 (0; 1). (1)
The set-up is henceforth as follows. Society chooses the liability regime.
It can also impose a lump-sum unconditional transfer t from potential injur-
ers to potential victims.3 Given the liability regime, potential injurers and
potential victims contract with risk-neutral insurers. Insurance markets are
competitive and coverage is sold at a fair price. Injurers purchase liability
insurance, victims purchase rst-party coverage against the risk that an in-
jurer is not held liable in full. Injurers then choose e¤ort. When an accident
occurs, the evidence is revealed. There are no litigation costs and parties
have symmetric information about the ex post evidence. They can therefore
perfectly anticipate the courts decision and it is indi¤erent whether they set-
tle or go to trial. For expository convenience, we assume that a trial always
takes place. Following the trial, transfers are made according to the damage
3The transfer could be negative. As in Shavell (1982), when injurer and victim are
in a producer-consumer relationship,   t can also be interpreted as the price paid by the
consumer for a unit of service.
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rule and the insurance contracts. Figure 1 summarizes the time line.
3 Market equilibria
Denote by w0 and v0 the initial wealth of injurers and victims respectively.
In equilibrium, victims expect to su¤er the loss l with probability p and to
be compensated according to D(x). Since they are risk-averse, they pur-
chase complete rst-party coverage against the risk of uncompensated losses,
therefore paying the insurance premium
(p) = pl   p
Z 1
0
D(x)f(x; p) dx: (2)
Given the lump-sum transfer, their equilibrium net wealth is
v  v0 + t (p): (3)
Consider now the injurersproblem. The liability insurance contract en-
tails a premium  and a transfer schedule I(). Following an accident and
the realization of the evidence, the injurer-insurer pair pays the victim the
damages D() imposed by the court, I() being the amount supported by the
insurer. We write the transfer from the insurer as I(z(x)) where the function
z(x) depends on the contractibility of the ex post evidence. We consider two
possibilities. In the rst case, the evidence x is fully contractible under the
liability insurance policy and z(x)  x. In the second case, transfers from
the insurer can only be contingent on court decisions, a constraint that is
captured by z(x)  D(x).
Contractible evidence refers to a situation where x directly becomes avail-
able to the liability insurer, irrespective of the liability regime, and consists
of veriable facts with respect to which a contract can be written. When a
lawsuit is led, the same facts are made available to the court if the prevailing
tort rule requires it to establish damages. By contrast, under non-contractible
evidence, the liability insurance contract cannot directly condition payments
on the same evidence as used by courts to reach a decision. The motivation
is that the evidence is often very detailed, e.g., the particular testimony of a
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particular witness with a particular credibility. While courts routinely assess
the weight that should be given to such evidence and rule accordingly, some
evidentiary outcomes are presumably too complex to be described ex ante
in the insurance policy.4 For simplicity, we consider only extreme cases: the
evidence is either fully contractible or non contractible at all.
Since insurance markets are competitive, insurers earn zero prots in
equilibrium and the liability insurance contracts maximize the injurersutility
subject to the zero prot condition. Given the damage rule, the contract
solves
max
p;;I
EU = (1  p)U (w0   t  ; e(p))
+ p
Z 1
0
U (w0   t    D(x) + I(z(x)); e(p)) f(x; p) dx: (4)
subject to
   p
Z 1
0
I(z(x))f(x; p) dx  0; (5)
EUp = 0: (6)
Equation (5) is the insurers non negative prot condition, equation (6) is
the incentive compatibility condition. The solution to this problem yields p,
 and I() such that (5) holds as an equality.
We now turn to the allocations induced by a market equilibrium under
some given damage rule. Let w  w0   t    and S()  D()   I(). The
injurers expected utility becomes
EU = (1  p)U (w; e(p)) + p
Z 1
0
U (w   S(z(x)); e(p)) f(x; p) dx: (7)
Substituting from (2) and (3), the non negative prot condition (5) rewrites
as
v +

w   p
Z 1
0
S(z(x))f(x; p) dx

 w0 + v0   pl: (8)
4A standard justication (e.g., Hart and Moore, 1999) is that it would be too costly
to write a contingent contract with respect to all possible states of the world, hence the
insurance contract is incomplete.
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An equilibrium yields an allocation that is completely characterized by
(v; w; S(); p) where p is the risk of loss, v is the victimsnet wealth, injurers
expected utility is given by (7) and the expected total wealth per victim-
injurer pair satises (8). The latter is the economys resource constraint on
an average per-capita basis. The right-hand side is the average net wealth
per pair of injurer-victim, taking accident costs into account. The left-hand
side is the sum of the victimsguaranteed wealth and of what a potential
injurer is allocated on average.
Observe that S() amounts to a penalty imposed on the injurer. The
allocation generated by a damage rule could therefore also be considered as
resulting from a direct penalty scheme chosen by a regulator, provided
penalties are non insurable. Clearly, any equilibrium allocation can be repli-
cated by a direct penalty scheme. A key question is whether a regulator
can do better. In this view, the set of feasible allocations is dened by the
resource constraint (8) and the incentive compatibility constraint (6) with
the injurers expected utility dened as in (7). Obviously, one must also
specify whether the direct penalty functions considered are constrained by
some given z(x).
When evidence is contractible, direct penalty schemes are of the form
S(x). The relevant benchmark set of feasible allocations then does not de-
pend on the damage rule. An equilibrium is e¢ cient if no direct penalty
scheme Pareto dominates it. In the next section we characterize e¢ cient
damage rules when the evidence is contractible. The case of non contractible
evidence is analyzed in section 5.
4 E¢ cient damage rules under contractible
evidence
From a welfare point of view, damage rules can be compared on the basis
of the equilibria they generate. We dene a damage rule to be e¢ cient if
it is not Pareto dominated by another damage rule under an appropriate
transfer t. Note that we dene e¢ ciency by comparison with other damage
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rules.5 Note also that damage rules can be compared in terms of the Pareto
criterion only by allowing appropriate modications of the transfer: rules
have redistributive implications in addition to providing incentives to exert
care.
We rst provide a condition for a damage rule to yield an equilibrium at
least as good as some given feasible allocation, where the latter may result
either from a direct penalty scheme or from some arbitrary damage rule.
Proposition 1 Any feasible allocation with (bp; bv) is weakly Pareto domi-
nated by the equilibrium under the damage rule D(x) and transfer t, where
D(x) is any rule such that bp maximizes (p) and t = (bp) + bv   v0.
To see the intuition, suppose that the injurer chooses bp in the equilibrium
under the rule D(x). In this equilibrium, the victim fully insures against
non compensated losses. Recalling (2), his premium for rst-party cover-
age is therefore (bp). It follows that the victims nal wealth is bv if the
unconditional transfer t satises
bv = v0 + t (bp):
Now, consider the possibility that in equilibrium the injurer in fact chooses
p 6= bp. Since the damage rule is such that (p)  (bp), the victim will then
pay a smaller premium for full coverage, so that his nal wealth will be larger
than bv. Hence, any deviation from bp on the part of the injurer benets the
victim. Since no arrangement between injurer and liability insurer can make
the victim worse o¤ than bv, a liability insurance contract that maximizes
the injurers expected utility, subject to D(x) and the insurers non negative
prot condition, yields an allocation at least as good as the initial one.
In particular, if the initial allocation is itself optimal (within the set of
feasible allocations under a direct penalty scheme), then it will be imple-
mented by a damage rule and transfer as specied in the proposition. In
other words, if bp is part of an optimal allocation, then with an appropriate
5This is not quite the same as dening a damage rule to be e¢ cient only if it yields an
e¢ cient allocation within the set of feasible allocations under a direct penalty scheme.
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transfer the optimum can be decentralized through a damage rule D(x)
satisfying bp 2 argmax
p
(p) = pl   p
Z 1
0
D(x)f(x; p) dx: (9)
Obviously, if a damage rule implements an optimum, it is also e¢ cient in
terms of our denition of e¢ cient rules. Proposition 1 therefore yields a
su¢ cient condition for a damage rule to be e¢ cient, in the sense of allowing
implementation of an optimum as an equilibrium.6
A damage rule satisfying (9) always exists. In fact, one such rule is strict
liability with D(x) = l for all x. The victims uncompensated expected
loss, (p), is then identically zero. Hence, it is maximized by any optimal
probability bp. Strict liability is therefore an e¢ cient rule. Moreover, since
any optimal allocation is implementable by a damage rule, we also have the
following:
Corollary 1 A damage rule is e¢ cient if, and only if, it implements an
e¢ cient allocation.
One may ask whether the premium maximization conditionin propo-
sition 1 is necessary. Specically, can a damage rule be e¢ cient if the equi-
librium probability of loss under the rule does not maximize the victims
premium? We show necessity under a minor additional condition.
Proposition 2 Let bp be part of an equilibrium allocation under a non in-
creasing damage rule D(x). If the equilibrium is e¢ cient, then bp maximizes
(p).
At equilibrium, the victims premium(bp) is the gap, as a function of the
injurers precautions, between the true expected loss and expected damages.
The gap describes the extent to which the damage rule does not internalize
upon the injurer-insurer pair the full expected harm su¤ered by third parties.
6Our result bears a similarity with Schweizer (2004) who examines su¢ cient conditions
for post-law payo¤ functions to induce an e¢ cient Nash equilibrium in the bilateral care
problem with observable e¤ort.
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In the proof of the proposition we show that, if the equilibrium is e¢ cient,
then 0(bp) = 0, that is,
@ (pl)
@p
=
@

p
R 1
0
D(x)f(x; p) dx

@p
; for p = bp: (10)
In words, even though compensatory damages need not always be paid by
the injurer-insurer pair, the damage rule must provide the same marginal
incentives as under complete internalization.7 When D(x) is non increasing,
(p) is concave, (10) therefore ensures that (p) is maximized at bp.
The condition that D(x) is non increasing in x has a straightforward
interpretation. By assumption large values of x constitute favorableevi-
dence suggesting high care. When a liability rule takes into consideration the
injurers likely level of care, the court should presumably not impose larger
damages as more favorable evidence is obtained.
The negligence rule. The foregoing propositions fully characterize the
set of e¢ cient damage rules when the evidence is contractible. Strict liability
has been shown to be one such rule. We henceforth discuss whether the
negligence rule also belongs to the e¢ cient set.
Under the negligence rule, recalling (1),
(p) = p (1  F (bx; p)) l:
From proposition 1, if bp is part of an optimal allocation, the allocation can
be implemented under the evidentiary standard bx solving
bp = argmax
p
p (1  F (bx; p)) : (11)
Conversely, proposition 2 applies since damages are non increasing in x under
a negligence rule. Thus, if bp is part of an equilibrium under the rule with
evidentiary standard bx, the equilibrium is e¢ cient only if bx solves (11). Note,
however, that the standard must satisfy bx < 1, otherwise the rule would
amount to strict liability.
7Under appropriate convexity conditions, the condition in proposition 2 is also su¢ cient
for an equilibrium to be e¢ cient (see our discussion of the negligence rule).
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Indeed, an important consideration for assessing the e¢ ciency of the neg-
ligence rule is the fact that such a standard may not exist. To see this,
dene
 (x; bp)  F (x; bp) + bpFp(x; bp) = @
@p
(pF (x; p))

p=bp : (12)
Due to assumption 2, (11) is equivalent to the rst-order condition  (bx; bp) =
1. Obviously,  (0; p) = 0 and  (1; p) = 1. Thus, (11) is solved by bx = 1.
The issue is whether there are other solutions. In gure 2,  is drawn as a
function of F (x; bp), a positive monotonic transformation of x. The curve is
concave since
d (x; bp)
dF (x; bp) = 1 + bpfp(x; bp)f(x; bp) ;
d2 (x; bp)
dF (x; bp)2 = bpf(x; bp) @@x

fp(x; bp)
f(x; bp)

< 0:
The gure depicts two possibilities. If  is as drawn, then a solutionbx < 1 exists and it is clearly unique. We denote this solution by x(bp), i.e.,
x(bp) solves (11) and is less than unity. F (x(bp); bp) is then the probability,
under the e¢ cient evidentiary standard, that an injurer exerting due care is
erroneously found negligent and may be referred to as the type 1 error. By
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contrast, x(bp) does not exist if  is a curve such as a. The implication is
then that the optimum cannot be implemented by the negligence rule.
The di¤erence between the two curves in the gure has to do with the in-
formational quality of the evidence. In a situation such as depicted by curve
a, the evidence provides relatively poor information about the injurers level
of care.8 By Holmströms (1979) information principle, an optimal direct
penalty scheme should nevertheless condition on the information, i.e., S(x)
should not be constant. However, the evidence is then too poor for a negli-
gence rule to provide appropriate incentives, although this is always feasible
under the strict liability rule as shown above. Thus, there is a di¤erence
between the value of information in the incentives-risk allocation trade-o¤
under moral hazard and its value for assigning liability. The next proposi-
tion summarizes our results.
Proposition 3 When the post accident evidence is directly contractible, any
optimum is implementable, given adequate transfers, (i) by the strict liability
rule, (ii) by the negligence rule under appropriate due care and evidentiary
standards, provided the evidence is su¢ ciently informative.
Note that implementing an e¢ cient allocation is nevertheless always fea-
sible under a modied negligence with decoupling, i.e., one that allows non
compensatory damages. From proposition 1, given an arbitrary standardbx, an e¢ cient bp is implementable with the punitive or undercompensatory
damages D satisfying
bp 2 argmax
p
(p) = pl   pF (bx; p)D:
From the rst-order condition, the appropriate amount of damages solves
 (bx; bp)D = l. In particular, when the evidence is insu¢ ciently informative
so that  (bx; bp) < 1 for all bx < 1, e¢ ciency under any arbitrary evidentiary
8The evidence in some situation A is more informative than in situation B if the  curve
in A is above that in B. This ranking of information systems follows from Demougin
and Fluet (2001). See the proof of proposition 3.
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standard is possible with some level of punitive damages D > l, as long as
we do not run into limited liability problems.9
In proposition 3, the strict liability and negligence rules (the latter with
some proviso) are shown to be e¢ cient because they can implement any
given optimal allocation, subject to appropriate transfers. One may also ask
whether the equilibrium under such rules is an e¢ cient allocation irrespective
of transfers, i.e., for any arbitrary t. It is trivial to show that the equilibrium
under strict liability is e¢ cient irrespective of t. Whether this is also true
under the negligence rule, however, requires additional conditions even when
the evidence is su¢ ciently informative.
Specically, take t as given, and suppose bp is part of the equilibrium under
the negligence rule with evidentiary standard x(bp). The necessary condition
of proposition 2 is satised, but can we conclude that the equilibrium is
e¢ cient? The following provides su¢ cient conditions. Denote by bU the
injurers expected utility in this equilibrium. Now, consider direct penalty
schemes and let W (p; bU) be the minimum net wealth that must be given to
the injurer, subject to his utility being bU when some arbitrary p is to be
implemented. From the resource constraint, the victims net wealth in such
schemes is easily seen to equal
w0 + v0   pl  W (p; bU):
The equilibrium described above is therefore e¢ cient if bp minimizes pl +
W (p; bU). The latter can be shown to hold if W (p; bU) is di¤erentiable and
convex in p.10 Observe that W (p; bU) would be convex in p if e¤ort were
perfectly observable. However, under moral hazard, the cost of implementing
some p depends on the property of the signal x at that level of e¤ort. Since
the signal may be more or less informative at di¤erent e¤ort levels, non
convexity is a possibility.
9The punitive part may be assumed to be retained by the victims insurer as compen-
sation for a reduced rst-party insurance premium. Alternatively, it can be paid to the
state and redistributed as non-conditional transfers.
10The conditions imply that p is part of an e¢ cient allocation if it solves l =  Wp(p; bU).
The proof of proposition 2 shows that the latter holds at the equilibrium bp.
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To conclude the section, we remark that the evidentiary standard for
establishing negligence can be given an interesting interpretation. Suppose
courts view the e¢ cient bp as reecting the legal due care standard, i.e., the
minimum level of precautions an injurer should have taken to escape a ruling
of negligence. From the above argument, we know that the court should rule
that less than due care was exerted if the evidence satises x < x(bp). Now,
consider an outsider who does not know the detailed evidence but is informed
of the courts decision. For this outsider, and using standard statistical ter-
minology, p (1  F (x(bp); p)) is the likelihood of care level p knowing that an
accident occurred and that the injurer was not found negligent. Thus, the ev-
identiary standard is e¢ cient if the outsiders maximum likelihood estimate
of p is then precisely bp. Moreover, the evidence is su¢ ciently informative
for the negligence rule to implement bp if, and only if, such an evidentiary
standard exists.
5 Non contractible evidence
In the above analysis, an e¢ cient damage rule leads the injurer-insurer pair
to behave as if it supported the full social costs of accidents. What matters
is the expected damages as a function of the injurers precautions. In par-
ticular, court decisions play no informational role in the design of liability
insurance contracts since the ex post evidence is veriable irrespective of the
liability regime. Indeed, given appropriate transfers, the same allocation can
be obtained under very di¤erent tort rules, e.g., the negligence rule or strict
liability.
The latter does not hold when the evidence is not directly contractible.
With insurance contracts constrained by court decisions, the transfer from
the liability insurer is then of the form I[D(x)]. In addition to providing
incentives to exert care, court decisions now generate relevant information
for contracting purposes. If the damage rule is a generalized D(x) strictly
increasing in x, all underlying information is of course indirectly revealed
and the results are the same as before. We therefore consider the case where
D(x) does not span the detailed evidence.
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Our motivation is the negligence rule. Apart from the mere occurrence
of an accident, contractible information under such a rule consists of the
signal liable-not liabledened by the evidentiary standard for a ruling of
negligence. Such a signal belongs to the family of binary signals of the form
zbx(x) =
(
0 if x < bx,
1 if x  bx, where bx 2 [0; 1]. (13)
While a binary signal is motivated by the negligence rule, other damage rules
are consistent with a similar information structure. Our aim is to assess how
well the negligence rule fares within this restricted set of rules. We therefore
consider the set of binary damage rules, now written as
D(zbx(x)) =
(
D if zbx(x) = 0,
D if zbx(x) = 1.
The notation makes explicit that a rule is characterized by a contractible
signal and by the damages imposed on the injurer for each realization of the
signal. The negligence rule corresponds to a signal with bx < 1 and damages
D = 0, D = l; strict liability is the degenerate case with bx = 1. Of particular
interest, as will become clear, is the modied negligence rule with decoupling,
i.e., with bx < 1, D = 0 and D 6= l.
As before, a damage rule is e¢ cient if it is not dominated by another rule,
but now within the set of binary damage rules.11 In discussing the e¢ ciency
of an allocation, we accordingly also limit consideration to direct penalty
schemes based on binary information structures. The e¢ ciency of a damage
rule now implies two things: (i) the equilibrium allocation is Pareto undomi-
nated within the set of direct penalty schemes based on the signal associated
with the rule; (ii) there exists no other damage rule, with a di¤erent binary
signal, supporting a better allocation.
Concerning point (i), it should be clear that, for a given signal zbx, propo-
sitions 1 and 2 still hold: it su¢ ces to replace the original signal x by zbx.
In this view, the propositions compare optimal and equilibrium allocations
11Rules generating a richer signal can do better.
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with the same information structure. Taking zbx as given, consider an opti-
mal direct penalty scheme with respect to this signal and denote by bp the
probability induced by the scheme. According to proposition 1, the same
allocation can be implemented by a damage rule D(zbx) such that
bp 2 argmax
p
(p) = pl   pF (bx; p)D   p (1  F (bx; p))D: (14)
Conversely, according to proposition 2, if the equilibrium under the rule
D(zbx) is undominated within the set of allocations associated with the same
signal zbx, then the equilibrium probability maximizes (p).
While the foregoing claries point (i), it says nothing about (ii) which
refers to the possibility that one damage rule may be better than another be-
cause it generates a bettersignal. Before addressing what bettermeans,
it is useful to discuss the relation between e¢ cient rules and optimal direct
penalty schemes, considering all possible binary signals. From the foregoing
results, the allocation obtained under any optimal scheme is implementable
by a damage rule with respect to the same signal if it satises (14). We
remark that such a rule always exists, the argument being the same as in
section 4. In particular, condition (14) is satised by the modied negligence
rule with D solving  (bx; bp)D = l, where  (bx; bp) is dened as in (12). It
follows that corollary 1 also applies in the present context, i.e., a damage
rule is e¢ cient if, and only if, it yields an e¢ cient allocation.
Moving to the comparison of signals, we next show that there is no global
ordering of binary signals. We prove this for the case where the injurers
utility function is separable, i.e., U(w; e) = u(w)   e.12 In the proposition
that follows, a signal is said to be preferred to another, for inducing some
probability bp, if it can sustain Pareto superior allocations. Dene
A(w) =  u
00(w)
u0(w)
; P (w) =  u
000(w)
u00(w)
:
A is the injurers coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion, P his degree of prudence
as dened in Kimball (1990). An agent is prudent if u000 is positive.
12The literature on the comparison of information structures in agency problems has
also dealt exclusively with the separable case.
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Proposition 4 Assume U(w; e) = u(w)   e and consider the set of direct
binary penalty schemes inducing bp. Generically, for any x0 2 (0; 1) there
exists x00 6= x0 such that: (i) if P < 3A , the signal dened by bx = min(x0; x00)
is preferred to the one dened by bx = max(x0; x00); (ii) the converse holds if
P > 3A.
When the agent is risk averse, a more informative signal sustains strictly
superior allocations because it improves the trade-o¤ between risk-sharing
and the provision of incentives (e.g., Holmström, 1990, and Kim, 1995).
Clearly, a signal generated by some bx 2 (0; 1) is more informative than the
degenerate signal with bx = 1 and is therefore preferred. The proposition
shows, by contrast, that the non degenerate signals themselves cannot be
ranked in terms of the information criterion: they merely partition di¤erently
the same underlying information. As a result, preferences over signals depend
on characteristics of the utility function other than risk aversion.13
Strict liability yields the least informative signal about the injurers be-
havior. One would therefore expect that rules generating a more informative
signals, such as the negligence rule, fare better. However, there is an addi-
tional problem here since a damage rule must also provide the appropriate
social incentives to the injurer-insurer pair. From this perspective, we know
that strict liability fully internalizes the externality. On the other hand, for
reasons similar to the ones underlying proposition 3, it may not be feasible to
provide appropriate incentives with the negligence rule unless the underlying
evidence is su¢ ciently informative. In addition, we show that, even when the
negligence rule fares better than strict liability, it is usually not an e¢ cient
rule.
Proposition 5 When evidence is non contractible, strict liability is inef-
cient. In particular, it is dominated by the negligence rule provided the
evidence is su¢ ciently informative. The negligence rule itself is generally
dominated by a modied negligence rule allowing decoupling.
13To illustrate, when the utility function is of the form u(w) = sgn()w with  < 1,
P 7 3A if  7 12 .
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By corollary 1, a damage rule is e¢ cient only if it implements an e¢ cient
allocation (now within the set of allocations supported by binary signals).
The ine¢ ciency of strict liability therefore follows trivially from the foregoing
discussion.14
The second claim concerns the possibility that the negligence rule consti-
tutes an improvement with respect to strict liability. The argument is as fol-
lows. Suppose the equilibrium under strict liability is characterized by bp and
provides the victim with the net wealth bv. If the evidence is su¢ ciently infor-
mative (recall gure 2), there exists x(bp) < 1 solving (11). Consider now the
best direct binary penalty scheme for implementing bp, subject to the victim
earning bv, under the signal generated by x(bp). By the information principle,
the resulting allocation is strictly better than the initial allocation.15 Now,
from proposition 1, the resulting allocation is itself weakly dominated by the
equilibrium implemented by the negligence rule with the signal dened by
x(bp), since (11) implies that bp maximizes (p).
The third claim is that the negligence rule itself is generally not e¢ cient.
Suppose it is and assume the evidentiary standard is some bx < 1, with the
resulting equilibrium characterized by some bp. By corollary 1, this equilib-
rium must be an e¢ cient allocation within the set of all binary allocations.
In addition, by proposition 2, we must have bx = x(bp), which does not depend
on the injurers utility function. However, proposition 4 shows that the best
signal for implementing bp depends on the properties of the utility function,
hence a contradiction since an improvement is then typically possible through
a modied negligence rule based on the bettersignal. The sequel of this
section illustrates this result.
Decoupling damages from harm. Consider an optimal allocation
under a direct penalty scheme with signal dened by bx and inducing somebp. As discussed above, the allocation can be implemented by the modied
14The proof in the appendix completes the argument in the text by extending Holm-
stroms information principle to non separable utility functions.
15The injurers expected utility can be increased because a more informative signal is
now used.
20
negligence rule with the same signal and with damages D satisfying
D =
l
 (bx; bp) :
The threshold bx in the optimal direct scheme depends inter alia on the
injurers utility function. It may therefore be below or above x(bp), assuming
the latter exists. Recalling gure 2, when bx > x(bp),  (bx; bp) > 1 so that
D < l, i.e., damages must be undercompensatory. Conversely, D > l whenbx < x(bp). Obviously, punitive damages are also needed when x(bp) does not
exist, i.e., when the evidence is insu¢ ciently informative so that  (bx; bp) < 1
for all bx < 1.
To illustrate, we present a family of cases where the optimal bx di¤ers
generically from x(bp). Suppose the underlying signal x is exponentially dis-
tributed, with F (x; p) = 1  exp   xp where x  0 and  is some positive
constant.16 It is easily checked that
bpx(bp) = 1: (15)
The proof of proposition 4 compares information structures with the same
Fisher index for implementing some given bp. As shown in the appendix,
the index depends on the threshold bx dening a binary signal through the
function
h(bx; bp)  F 2p (bx; bp)
F (bx; bp) (1  F (bx; bp)) = 2
 bxbp2bp2 (exp (bxbp)  1) :
It is easily seen that h(0; bp) = h(1; bp) = 0 and that h(x; bp) is maximized by
x(bp) solving
bpx(bp) = k  argmax
t

t2
exp t  1

' 1:59:
In gure 3, the signals with thresholds x0 and x00 have the same Fisher
index. When the injurers utility function satises P < 3A, the signal with
16The support of x is then not the unit interval, contrary to the assumption made so
far. However, one could dene the equivalent signal y  F (x; p0) where p0 2 (0; 1) is some
arbitrary probability.
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Figure 3: Preferences over signals
the smaller threshold x0 is preferred. When P > 3A, the signal dened
by x00 is preferred. It follows that the optimal signal for implementing bp is
characterized by a threshold to the right of x(bp) when P > 3A and by a
threshold to the left of x(bp) when P < 3A.
Now, it is straightforward to verify that x(bp) ? x(bp) if k ? 1, i.e,
irrespective of the value of bp. Thus, if k < 1 and P < 3A, an optimal
signal is dened by some threshold smaller than x(bp), implying that punitive
damages are always required. When k > 1 and P > 3A, we get the opposite
case where an e¢ cient rule is always characterized by undercompensatory
damages.17
17The need for punitive damages because of insu¢ ciently informative evidence does not
arise here: for any , there is a nite x(bp) solving (15).
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6 Concluding remarks
Tort rules are relatively straightforward mechanisms. A courts role is to
assess certain things, e.g., the amount of harm su¤ered by the victim, the
injurers precautions, the precautions he should have taken given the circum-
stances, and to assign liability according to the prevailing rule. In simple
cases, this provides potential tort-feasors with appropriate incentives to pre-
vent harm.
We assumed that the actual amount of harm was observable without er-
ror and that the e¢ cient due care level was known to the court. We then
proceeded to verify whether the standard negligence rule with compensatory
damages, given liability insurance, yields an e¢ cient outcome even though
the injurers precautions are imperfectly observable. Because evidence was
imperfect, our formulation of the negligence rule needed to be complemented
by the notion of evidentiary standard, a basic legal construct. We showed
that, if liability insurers and courts can both condition directly on the same
evidence, e¢ cient allocations can be implemented by the negligence rule pro-
vided the evidence is su¢ ciently informative. The required weight of evi-
dence for establishing whether the injurer exerted due care was shown to
depend only on the relation between care and evidentiary outcomes. An e¢ -
cient decentralized set-up is therefore feasible where courts do what they are
meant to do and insurers maximize prots by providing policyholders with
the best contracts, subject to the liability risks they face.
This separation result breaks down if, as in practice is often the case,
court decisions  rather than the detailed evidence available following an
accident  constitute relevant information for contracting purposes. The
problem arises because the courts evidentiary standard now does two things.
First, it determines the liability risk imposed on the injurer-insurer pair as a
function of the injurers e¤ort. For instance, a very demanding standard (a
small bx) would impose little liability risk, resulting in insu¢ cient incentives
to take precautions. Secondly, the evidentiary standard also determines the
properties of the signal represented by court decisions. It therefore also
a¤ects the risk sharing-incentives trade-o¤ in the liability insurance policy.
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As a consequence, one instrument is missing for the resulting equilibrium to
be e¢ cient.
Decoupling damages from harm adds the missing instrument. Depending
on the tort-feasors risk preferences and the informational properties of the
evidence, an e¢ cient rule is then generally characterized either by punitive
damages together with a demanding evidentiary standard or by undercom-
pensatory damages and a relatively weak standard. Obviously, the optimal
modied negligence rule described in the paper is ne-tuned. Even if courts
know the correct due-care standard, they need to solve a complex optimal
mechanism problem to determine the appropriate evidentiary standard and
level of damages, which presumably is not what courts or legal rules are
meant to do. Indeed, the task is computationally as complex as nding the
optimal direct penalty scheme. Nevertheless, our results suggest that dam-
age caps and weak evidentiary standards or the converse could constitute an
improvement in situations where risk preferences and the nature of the likely
evidence are well understood.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 1. Let (bv; bw; bS; bp) be a feasible allocation, i.e., satisfying
(8) and (6) with the injurers expected utility written as in (7). Denote by
p the equilibrium probability under the transfer and damage rule satisfying
the conditions in the proposition. The victim then pays the premium (p)
and his net wealth is
v = v0 + t (p) = bv +(bp) (p) > bv:
Consider now the injurer. The equilibrium insurance contract and probability
of loss maximize (4) subject to (5) and (6). Write w  w0   t    and
S  D   I. The non negative prot constraint (5) becomes
w0   t  w   p
Z 1
0
(D   S)f dx > 0: (A1)
Denote by (; I) the equilibrium contract, so that the resulting allocation is
(v; w; S; p) with w  w0   t    and S  D   I. Writing (4), (5) and (6)
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in terms of w and S shows that (w; S; p) maximizes (7) subject to (A1) and
the incentive constraint (6). Thus, if the initial ( bw; bS; bp) satises the same
constraints, the injurers equilibrium utility cannot be smaller than with the
initial allocation. The latter satises (6). We therefore only need to show
that it also satises (A1). Replacing t by bv + (bp)   v0 and using (2), the
constraint (A1) is equivalent to
w0 + v0   pl > bv + w   p Z 1
0
Sf dx+(bp) (p): (A2)
Since ( bw; bS; bp) satises the resource constraint (8), it also satises (A2).
Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 2.We rst prove that e¢ ciency of the equilibrium implies
0(bp) = 0. Let v = v0 + t   (p), w  w0   t   , S  D   I, and
assume the equilibrium allocation (bv; bw; bS; bp) is e¢ cient. Denote by bU the
injurers expected utility in equilibrium. Since the allocation is e¢ cient,
it must maximize the victims net wealth in the set of feasible allocations
providing the injurer with at least bU . From the resource constraint (8), the
victims net wealth satises
v = w0 + v0   pl   w + p
Z
Sf dx:
Consider the problem of maximizing the victims net wealth, given bU and for
some arbitrary p, i.e.,
min
w;S

w   p
Z
Sf dx

such that EU > bU , EUp = 0: (A3)
For future reference, call this program P (p; bU). Denote the solution value by
W (p; bU) and assume the function is di¤erentiable with respect to p.18 The
victims wealth is then w0 + v0   pl  W (p; bU). If bp is part of an e¢ cient
allocation, it must therefore be that
l =  Wp(bp; bU): (A4)
18A proof which does not require this assumption is available upon request.
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The liability insurers expected prot is
   p
Z
If dx = w0   t  p
Z
Df dx  w +
Z
Sf dx
In equilibrium, the insurer proposes a contract that maximizes expected
prot subject to the injurer obtaining the equilibrium utility bU . Thus, the in-
surer considers w and S solving (A3), for any p that might be induced by the
contract, and chooses p to maximize w0   t  p
Z
D(x)f(x; p)dx W (p; bU).
Since bp is part of the equilibrium,
@

p
Z
Df dx

=@p

p=bp =  Wp(bp; bU): (A5)
Combining (A4) and (A5) yields 0(bp) = 0.
We now show that the latter implies that (p) is maximized at bp when
D is non increasing. Denote by xi; i = 1; ::; n, the points of discontinuity of
D, with
x0 = 0 < x1 < :::: < xn < xn+1 = 1:
Integrating by parts,Z xi+1
xi
Df dx = D(x i+1)F (xi+1; p) D(x+i )F (xi; p) 
xi+1Z
xi
D0F dx:
We thus have
p
Z 1
0
Df dx = p
nX
i=0
(
Z xi+1
xi
Df dx)
= pD(1) +
nX
i=1
(D(x i ) D(x+i ))pF (xi; p)
 
Z 1
0
D0pF (x; p) dx: (A6)
When D(x) is non increasing, D(x i )   D(x+i ) > 0 and D0(x)  0. Using
assumption 2, (A6) is therefore convex, leading to 00(p)  0. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 3. Assume (bp; bv) belongs to an optimal allocation. Part
(i) follows from proposition 1 and required transfer satises bv = v0 + t.
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The rst part of (ii) also follows from proposition 1 in the case where x(bp)
exists. The due care standard is then bp, the evidentiary standard is x(bp)
and the required transfer satises bv = v0 + t   (bp). When x(bp) does not
exist, the su¢ cient conditions of proposition 1 are not met by the negligence
rule. However, proposition 2 implies that the existence of x(bp) is necessary.
The argument is by contradiction. Suppose a negligence rule implements bp.
Since the equilibrium is an e¢ cient allocation, proposition 2 implies that the
evidentiary standard bx solves (11). Moreover, if the rule is one of negligence,
we need bx < 1. Hence, the standard must be x(bp).
The second part of (ii) relates the existence of x(bp) to the informativeness
of the evidence. Compare two situations, one represented by the distribution
F (x; p), the other by the distribution G(x; p), both satisfying MLRP. The
integral criterionin Demougin and Fluet (2001) states that F is more infor-
mative thanG if, for all p, Fp(x0; p)  Gp(x00; p) whenever F (x0; p) = G(x00; p).
Intuitively, the more informative the evidence, the more the probability of
unfavorable evidence is sensitive to changes in the level of care. The criterion
is equivalent to Kim s(1995) mean preserving spread condition on likelihood
ratios. Thus, for x0 and x00 such that F (x0; p) = G(x00; p),
F (x0; p) + pFp(x0; p)  G(x00; p) + pGp(x00; p): (A7)
With respect to gure 2, this means that the  -curve for F is above the
one for G. If F (bx; p) + pFp(bx; p) < 1 for all bx < 1, then by (A7) the same
holds for any less informative G. Conversely if there exists bx < 1 such that
G(bx; p) + pGp(bx; p) = 1, then the same is true with a more informative F .
Q.E.D.
Before proving proposition 4, we introduce an intermediate result for
comparing random variables. A variable eY is said to have more downside
risk than a variable Y if any prudent decision-maker prefers Y to eY (Menezes,
Geiss and Tressler, 1980).
Lemma 1. Let Y and eY be two random variables with support in the interval
[a; b] and cumulative distribution functions H and eH. Assume that Y and eY
have the same mean and the same variance. If H(y) and eH(y) cross twice
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and eH(y) H(y) > 0 for small values of y 2 [a; b], then eY has more downside
risk than Y .
Proof of lemma 1. Let  () be a thrice di¤erentiable VNM utility function.
E[ (Y )]  E[ (eY )] = Z b
a
 0(y)( eH(y) H(y)) dy:
Note that this also holds when the variables have discrete support. Integrating
by parts twice yields
E[ (Y )]  E[ (eY )] = Z b
a
 00(y)
Z y
a
(H(t)  eH(t)) dt dy
=
Z b
a
 000(y)
Z y
a
Z z
a
( eH(t) H(t)) dt dz dy: (A8)
The rst step follows from
R b
a
(H(t)   eH(t))dt = 0 when Y and eY have the
same mean, the second step from the fact that the same mean and same
variance implies Z b
a
Z z
a
( eH(t) H(t)) dt dz = 0: (A9)
Since Y and eY have the same mean, if eH(y) and H(y) cross twice and
the di¤erence is positive for small values of y, then
R z
a
eH(t) dt and R z
a
H(t) dt
cross once and the di¤erence is positive for small values of z. It follows thatZ y
a
Z z
a
( eH(t) H(t)) dt dz
is at rst increasing in y and then decreasing. Given (A9), the expression
is therefore always positive. Thus, (A8) is positive when  000 > 0, implying
that a prudent decision-maker prefers Y to eY . Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 4: The proof borrows from Fagart and Sinclair-Desgagné
(forthcoming). They compare signals with the same Fisher index for imple-
menting a given level of e¤ort from an agent with utility function U(w; e) =
u(w)  e. If u satises P < 3A, a signal is preferred if the distribution of the
likelihood ratio of e has more downside risk, i.e., the risk-neutral principal
then pays a smaller expected wage. The converse holds when P > 3A. In
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our setting, an e¢ cient direct scheme for implementing p, equivalently the
e¤ort level e(p), minimizes the injurers expected wealth (i.e., maximizes the
victims net wealth) subject to some reservation utilityfor the injurer. In
order for likelihood ratios to have the same signs as in Fagart and Sinclair-
Desgagné, we take the inverse of e(p) and write the probability of accident
as p(e). Note that p0 < 0.
For any threshold bx 2 [0; 1] dening the binary signal discussed in the
text, a direct penalty scheme conditions payments on the events accident
and x < bx, accident and x  bx, and no accident. We represent this
information structure by the ternary signal
zbx =
8>><>>:
0 with probability 0(bx; e) = p(e)F (bx; p(e));
1 with probability 1(bx; e) = p(e) (1  F (bx; p(e))) ;
2 with probability 2(bx; e) = 1  p(e): (A10)
The likelihood ratio associated with the signal is the random variable
ybx  @ lnzbx(bx; e)
@e
; where zbx 2 f0; 1; 2g:
Its distribution is
ybx =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
y0(bx; e)  p0(e)
p(e)
+
p0(e)Fp(bx; p(e))
F (bx; p(e)) with probability 0(bx; e);
y1(bx; e)  p0(e)
p(e)
  p
0(e)Fp(bx; p(e))
1  F (bx; p(e)) with probability 1(bx; e);
y2(bx; e)    p0(e)
1  p(e) with probability 2(bx; e):
(A11)
For any bx, the variable ybx has zero mean. The Fisher index of the signal
zbx is the variance of ybx, the value of which is
'(bx) = p(p0)2
1  p + (p
0)2p

F 2p (bx; p)
F (bx; p) (1  F (bx; p))

: (A12)
Obviously, '(0) = '(1) since the second term in (A12) di¤ers from zero only
for bx 2 (0; 1). Therefore, for any x0 =2 argmaxx '(x), there exists x00 6= x0 such
that '(x00) = '(x0). Moreover, when argmaxx '(x) is not unique, the same
is true for any x0. Thus, given some x0, there generically exists x00 6= x0 such
that yx0 and yx00 have both the same mean and the same variance.
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We next show that the cumulative distributions of yx0 and yx00 satisfy the
other conditions of lemma 1. Given MLRP and omitting reference to e for
simplicity, y0(bx) and y1(bx) are both increasing in bx and y0(x0) < y1(x00) for
any x0, x00 2 (0; 1). Let x0 < x00. Then
y0(x
0) < y0(x00) < y1(x0) < y1(x00).
Denoting the cumulative of ybx by H(y; bx), the di¤erence in the cumulatives
of yx0 and yx00 is then easily seen to satisfy
H(y; x0) H(y; x00) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0 if y < y0(x0);
pF (x0; p)) > 0 if y 2 [y0(x0); y0(x00));
p(F (x0; p)  F (x00; p)) < 0 if y 2 [y0(x00); y1(x0));
p(1  F (x00; p)) > 0 if y 2 [y1(x0); y1(x00));
0 if y  y1(x00):
The conditions of lemma 1 are therefore satised, so that yx0 has more
downside risk than yx00. Thus, if '(x0) = '(x00), we can apply the Fagart and
Sinclair-Desgagné criterion, which yields that the signal zx0 is preferred to
zx00 when the injurers utility function satises P < 3A. The converse holds
when P > 3A. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 5. We complete the argument in the text by extending
Holmstroms information principle to non separable utility functions. For
some arbitrary threshold bx, let zbx be dened as in (A10). Consider the
program dened in (A3) but now with S constrained by zbx. Call this program
P (p; zbx; bU) with solution value W (p; zbx; bU). For simplicity, write w(i) 
w   S(i), where i = 0; 1; 2 and S(2)  0. For any threshold bx and for the
given e¤ort level e = e(bp), program P (bp; zbx; bU) can be written as:
min
w()
2X
i=0
i(bx; e)w(i)
such that
2X
i=0
i(bx; e)U(w(i); e) > bU ;
2X
i=0
yi(bx; e)i(bx; e)U(w(i); e) + 2X
i=0
i(bx; e)Ue(w(i); e) = 0;
30
where the i(bx; e)s are dened as in (A10) and the yi(bx; e)s as in (A11).
Denote by  the multiplier of the participation constraint and by  that of
the incentive constraint. From the necessary conditions for solving program
P (bp; zbx; bU),
Uw(w(i); e) +  [yi(bx; e)Uw(w(i); e) + Uwe(w(i); e)] = 1, i = 0; 1; 2: (A13)
The best penalty scheme (from the victims point of view) with respect
to the degenerate signal with bx = 1 solves P (bp; z1; bU). Now consider any
threshold bx 2 (0; 1) and the associated program P (bp; zbx; bU). The scheme
solving P (bp; z1; bU) satises the constraints of P (bp; zbx; bU) with w(0) = w(1).
Therefore, W (bp; z1; bU)  W (bp; zbx; bU) and W (bp; z1; bU) > W (bp; zbx; bU) if the
solutions di¤er. To show that they do, we prove that w(0) 6= w(1) in the
solution of P (bp; zbx; bU). Suppose the contrary. From (A13), w(0) = w(1)
implies y0(bx; e) = y1(bx; e), yielding  = 0 for any bx 2 (0; 1). As  > 0,
 = 0 implies w(0) = w(1) = w(2), which in turn contradicts the incentive
constraint because Ue < 0. Since strict liability solves P (bp; z1; bU) for the
equilibrium bU , by corollary 1 strict liability is not an e¢ cient rule. Q.E.D.
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